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Introduction 
1 Much of our knowledge is hypothetical in nature and can be expressed in the form of
conditionals  (e.g.,  If  you  study  hard,  you  will  succeed  in  the  exams)  expressing  the
contingency  between an antecedent  (A)  and consequent  (C)  event.  We can use  such
knowledge or beliefs to guide our actions (e.g., given a desired outcome like succeeding in
one's exams, one knows what to do). In such cases one is reasoning from a particular
belief: one takes one's beliefs for granted and does not put them into question. In other
cases, the beliefs itself are put into question: one is reasoning about a particular belief. Is
it really the case that studying hard will ensure succeeding? Is it possible that one can
succeed without studying hard? Reasoning about our beliefs seems particularly prevalent
when expectations do not pan out or when integrating new observations and experiences
within our belief system. A desirable property of such a belief system seems to be its
internal consistency,  even though many people will  often not be concerned with the
coherence of their beliefs and will hold mutually incompatible beliefs. How do people go
about in evaluating the consistency of their beliefs? Do people reason from or do they
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reason about their beliefs in judging whether they are compatible, or both? The present
paper  addresses  this  question  via  the  theoretically  loaded  discussion  regarding  the
compatibility of two conditional beliefs of the form <if A then C> and <if A then not
-C>.
We refer to such conditionals, which most people consider contradictory, as “contrary
conditionals”. 
2 Handley, Evans and Thompson (2006) presents a thought provoking analysis of <if A then
C> conditionals, whose believability/acceptability in suppositional-conditional theory is a
function of the conditional probability of the consequent <C>, given the antecedent <A>.
When people reason about rather than reason from conditionals (i.e., when they do not
accept  the conditional  as  true  and  question  its  plausibility/acceptability),  having  a
conditional-probability interpretation of "if it rains, then the match will be cancelled"
means  its  plausibility  is  measured as  the  conditional  probability  of  the  match being
cancelled, given that it rains. This conditional probability is a function of the relative
likelihood of <A_C> and <A_not-C> cases: e.g., situations in which a match is cancelled
when it rains and situations in which a match is not cancelled when it rains (see, e.g.,
Evans, Over, & Handley, 2003; Schroyens, Schaeken, & Dieussaert, 2008). Classically these
two so-called truth-table cases are referred to as true-antecedent cases; respectively: 
• True-antecedent-True-consequent: TT<A_C> 
• True-antecedent-False-consequent: TF<A_Not-C> The false-antecedent cases are referred to
as: 
• False-antecedent-True-consequent: FT<not-A_C> 
• False-antecedent-False-consequent: TF<Not-A_Not-C> These false-antecedent cases are
considered irrelevant according to the suppositional-conditional theory and its conditional-
probability approach to reasoning about (vs. from) conditionals. 
3 The presumed irrelevancy of  false-antecedent cases in suppositional  theory stands in
contrast  to  mental-models  theory.  Like  suppositional  theory,  mental-models  theory
supposes people first consider only true-antecedent cases. More specifically, it supposes
initially only TT<A_C> cases are considered. This is the so-called implicit-model principle
(a.k.a. the initial-model principle: Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Schroyens & Braem, in
press). The true-antecedent case TF<A_Not-C> is not initially considered according to the
so-called truth-principle (cf. Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p. 653; Schroyens, Schaeken, &
d’Ydewalle,  1996,  1999).  The  truth-principle  concurs  with  a  Gricean  maxim  of
conversation (Grice, 1975): we always begin by assuming the truth of given sentential
information.  Since  falsity  cannot  exist  prior  to  truth  (just  as  negation  cannot  exist
without  something  to  be  negated),  it  seems  no  theory  can  avoid  making  such  an
assumption. Due to the initial-model principle, and the false-antecedent cases not being
represented initially, the false-antecedent cases will tend to be judged irrelevant. But, the
irrelevancy is not fixed. It holds initially, i.e., it holds when making judgments on the
basis of the initial-model representation. Alternative possibilities to the initial-model are
considered  and  mental-models  theory  maintains  that  irrelevancy  judgments  of  such
alternative false-antecedent cases are dependent upon the specific content of, and the
context of  reasoning from or about,  conditionals (cf.  the principles of  pragmatic and
semantic modulation; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p. 658-659). 
4 As a consequence of  the initial-model  principle  and the principle  that  at  least  some
people  at  least  sometimes  consider  alternatives,  it  is  only  at  first  sight  that  false-
antecedent cases are judged irrelevant.  When people do not satisfice,  pragmatics and
semantics aid in constructing alternatives to this initial model of TT<A_C>. For instance,
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when asked to evaluate false-antecedent cases like FF<Not-A_Not-C> (e.g., it does not rain
and the match is not cancelled), the pragmatic context gives a clear reason to consider
FF<Not-A_Not-C>  cases:  one  is  asked  to  do  so,  and  even  if  one  were  unwilling  to
participate  in  the  task,  the  mere  fact  of  having  read  the  question  almost  forces
consideration of FF<Not-A_Not-C>. That is, when there is no need to generate FF<Not-
A_Not-C> (since provided by context), people have only to judge whether it is consistent
or  inconsistent  with  <if  A  then C>.  Mental-models  theory  proffers  only  TF<A_not-C>
falsifies <if A then C> (cf. the core-meaning principle: Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). It
follows that both FF<not-A_not-C> and FT<not-A-C> (e.g. it does not rain, but the match is
nonetheless cancelled,  e.g.,  because of an extreme heat wave) are possible,  given the
truth of the conditional. 
5 FF<Not-A_Not-C> being a true possibility is central to the Handley et al (2006) critique of
mental-models theory. (True possibility is short hand for a contingency that is possible,
given the truth of the utterance and does not mean such a case makes the conditional
true: cf. infra, also see Schroyens, 2009). The paper argues that <if A then C> and <if A
then  not-C>  are  incompatible  according  to  suppositional-conditional  theory  and
compatible according to mental-models theory and presents compelling evidence that in
fact, most people do not consider these contrary claims compatible (also Pollard & Evans,
1980). If and only if their argument and treatment of mental-models theory is right, they
provide  a  strong  case  against  mental-models  theory  and  establish  an  increase  in
suppositional theory’s degree of corroboration. However, a close reading of Handley et al.
(2006)  reveals  there  might  be  a  problem  with  the  argumentation  and  treatment  of
mental-models theory presented therein. 
6 Handley et al. (2006) supposes that a task requires reasoning from conditionals when they
are evaluating their  own theory while  they suppose a  task requires  reasoning about
conditionals  when they are evaluating an opposing theory.  Contrary conditionals are
incompatible when one assumes – as Handley et al. (2006) claims mental-models theory
does – people engage in the following type of compatibility-judgment processes: 
7 Two conditionals are compatible in the model theory because they share two common
possibilities: ~pq and ~p~q” (Handley et al.,  2006, p. 560). The use of possibility-based
compatibility judgments presumes people are reasoning about the truth or truthfulness
of  conditionals  on the basis  of  possibilities,  whereas  suppositional-conditional  theory
only predicts the incompatibility of contrary conditionals when it is assumed people are
reasoning from the presumed truth of conditionals. "In the extreme case where one of
these  is  assumed certain  (P  (q/p)  =  1),  then the  other  must  be  false  (P  (¬q|p)  =  0)"
(Handley et al., 2006, p. 559).  A task obviously does not suddenly change in the eyes of the
participants  depending  upon  the  theory  an  experimenter  applies  to  explain  their
performance. 
8 Handley et al. (2006) seems to adopt a different task construal and different notion of
compatibility to judge their own theory as compared to what they present as a rival
theory -- which for one or the other reason they presume needs to make opposing
predictions (see, p. 560: “Clearly, the account cannot agree”), even though it is clear that
such is not necessary: most theories that have some plausibility will show considerable
overlap in the phenomena and established facts that they can and need to explain. We
can altogether set aside or postpone a further theoretical discussion as regards the at
least apparent case of special pleading in Handley et al. (2006), which is likely to be of
more  interest  to  experts  and/or  more  philosophically  interested  readers  who  are
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concerned  with  the  fairness,  rigor  and  correctness  of  scientific  argumentation.
Possibility-based compatibility is ultimately a hypothesis about how people go about in
reasoning about two conditionals in order to decide whether they are compatible or not.
It  might ultimately be a mistake to assume that people are reasoning about the two
conditionals to ascertain whether they are compatible. Maybe they engage at least in part
in reasoning from their beliefs in order to judge whether they are compatible. Let us start
our investigation by considering the former possibility both within mental-models theory
and suppositional-conditional theory. 
 
Leveling the bar: possibility-based compatibility judgments 
9 In Handley et al. (2006) we see the theoretical statement that – according to Handley et
al.'s  interpretation  --  mental-models  theory  predicts  that  contrary  conditionals  are
compatible. 
10 “According  to  the  extensional  semantics  of  Johnson-Laird  and  Byrne  (2002),  the
conditionals [if A then C] and [if A then not C] are not incompatible” (Evans et al., 2005, p.
1049). Given the presumed possibility-based compatibility-judgment process, it is indeed
easy to  see  that  in  mental-models  theory <if  A and C>  and <if  A and not-C>  should
sometimes  be  judged  compatible.  At  best  one  can  make  the  prediction  that  only
sometimes the contrary conditionals would be compatible. Mental-models theory makes
several processing assumptions that prevent making the prediction that all people judge
contrary conditionals  to  be  incompatible,  even when we accept  the  assumption that
people engage in possibility-based compatibility judgments. The assumption that people
engage in making possibility-based judgments is a real assumption. This assumption is
not a given, even though Handley et al.  (2006) suggests it is a given about reasoning
within mental-models theory1. 
 
Table 1 Truth contingencies that are possible for two contrary conditionals, when reasoning from
the assumption the conditionals are true. 
Conditional: if p then q     
Contingency if A then C if A then Not-C
TT(p.q) : A C A Not-C
FT(¬p.q) : Not-A C Not-A Not-C
FF(¬p.¬q) Not-A Not-C Not-A Not(not-C)
11 Mental-models are in essence representations of possibilities and mental-models theory
proposes that one's interpretation of a natural language sentence is determined by the
possibilities one considers consistent with the sentence. If people go beyond the initial-
model  representation  (i.e.,  TT<A_C>)  and  if  people  reason  towards  the  so-called
conditional interpretation of the contrary conditionals <if A then C> and <if A then not-
C>, then people will consider three possibilities that are consistent with the assumption
that these conditional are true. Table 1 presents the three true possibilities, that is, the
contingencies that are possible when reasoning from the conditionals by assuming these
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beliefs are true. Considering these two model setsii,  it  is clear people would consider
<not-A_not-C> cases true possibilities for both <if A then C> and <if A then not-C>. The
<not-A_not-C> cases are instances of FF vis-à-vis <if A then C> and they are instances of FT
vis-à-vis <if A than not-C>. Both FF and FT cases are true possibilities when people reason
towards a conditional interpretation. Hence, the conditionals are* not possibility-based
incompatible  --  at  least  for  those  people  who  do  not  satisifice  with  their  initial
representation  of  such  conditionals  and  do  not  reason  towards  an  alternative
interpretation such as the biconditional interpretation. We use * here as a reminder of
the slippery slope between the prediction that something 'has to be the case", i.e., is a
factual necessity as opposed to 'can be the case", i.e., is a contingent possibility depending
on other factors like to two we just detailed. 
12 To follow up the consequence of a possibility-based compatibility-judgment process in
mental-models theory, it is only required that the theory allows for shared possibilities in
the  representation  of  the  two  contrary  conditionals.  Stripping  off  much  of  the
complicated and complicating theoretical  baggage,  it  was easy to show that contrary
conditionals are* not incompatible according to mental-models theory. It is just as easy to
see  that  contrary  conditionals  are*  possibility based  compatible  in  suppositional-
conditional  theory.  This  follows  from  the  fact  that  suppositional conditional  theory
claims, like mental-models theory does,  that both FF and FT cases are possible when
judging  these  cases  as  possible/impossible  given  the  conditional  it  true  (i.e.,  when
reasoning  from  the  conditional).  If  the  possible  nature of  false-antecedent  cases  is
sufficient to judge the conditionals compatible (as assumed by setting aside the additional
requirements in mental-models theory that people do not satisfice and do not reason
towards  a  biconditional  interpretation:  hence  the  “*”),  then it  follows  that  contrary
conditionals are* also possibility-based compatible in suppositional conditional  theory.
The theory supposes that FF and FT are possible cases. Hence, the contrary conditionals
are* possibility-based compatible. 
13 Suppositional-conditional  theorists  might  rebut  that  the  possibility-based  notion  is
incompatible  with  the  theory  since  it  requires  a  truth-functional  treatment  of
possibilities, which the theory does not support. That is, it would require that the FF<not-
A.not-C> case makes the conditional true and that the same <not-A.not-C> case for if A
then  not-C  (which  now  has  the  status  of  an  FT  case)  similarly  makes  the  contrary
conditional  true.  Suppositional-conditional  theory  indeed  holds  that  false-antecedent
cases are irrelevant. However, this does not mean false-antecedent cases are never taken
to make a conditional true. Indeed, meta-analyses on truth-table tasks – tasks asking
people to judge whether the TT,  TF,  FT,  FF case make the conditional  true,  false,  or
whether they are irrelevant (Schroyens, in press a) – have firmly established that people
in fact frequently evaluate the false-antecedent cases as making a conditional true. This is
a phenomenon that suppositional conditional theory also proclaims to explain. It follows
that nothing in the theory prevents it from considering a possibility-based compatibility
judgments. If not, it would not be able to account for actual truth-table task performance.
In Experiment 1 we consider the appropriateness of using the possibility-based notion of
compatibility. 
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Experiment 1: The inappropriateness of possibility-
based compatibility judgments 
14 Let us assume that the Handley et al. (2006) definition of possibility-based compatibility is
normatively justified and that it is correct to assume that people are reasoning about
their  conditional  beliefs  when  evaluating  whether  such  beliefs  are  compatible.  Both
theories would thus agree people should judge contrary conditionals compatible, given
the established fact people judge false antecedent cases as being possible. But, should is
not  would  (Mandel,  2000).  Nobody  expects  modal  reasoners  to  live  up  to  idealized
standards of normative theories (Stanovich & West, 2000; Stanovich, 2004; Schroyens et
al.,  2008,  Schroyens,  in  press  b).  Handley et  al.  (2006)  provided compelling evidence
showing people generally do not live up to the hypothesized norm of possibility-based
compatibility judgments. 
15 The  normative  appropriateness  of  particular  standards  of  judgments  has  been
investigated  on  the  basis  of  the  so-called  understanding-acceptance  principle  (e.g.
Stanovich & West, 1999, 2000). The understanding-acceptance principle reflects the idea
that if people understand the normative basis for a particular response they will accept
that response and behave accordingly. When people understand the normative basis for a
particular response (like a possibility-based compatibility judgments) and do not accept
the  response,  this  argues  against  the  normative  appropriateness  of  the  response.
Stanovich  and  West  (1999)  pointed  out  that  there  are  two  ways  to  implement  the
understanding-acceptance principle as a research methodology. First, the gap between
the  descriptive  and  the  normative  should  be  smaller  for  those  individuals  who  are
independently classified as more 'intelligent'. More 'intelligent' people would be more
likely to understand and thus accept the norm. It is this individual-differences approach
that  has  been  applied  most  intensively,  but  which  has  also  been  criticised  most
intensively  –  probably  in  part  because  of  the somewhat  elitist  idea that  'smarter'  is
'better'. 
16 The second method and application of the understanding-acceptance principle is  less
evaluative and involves setting up conditions in such a way that people are in the ideal
situation to come to an understanding. Schroyens et al. (2008) accordingly labelled this
the  idealization  hypothesis,  i.e.,  the  "general  principle  that  when we  approach  the
idealization, e.g., by imposing contextual constraints that bring us nearer to the idealized
language game, we should observe behavior that more closely approaches the strictures
and implications of that language game" (p. 180). Presuming for arguments sake that
possibility-based compatibility is  normatively appropriate,  mental-models theory only
allows for such compatible judgments when people do not satisfice with their  initial
representation and reason towards a conditional interpretation in which both the FF<not-
A_not-C> and FT<not-A_C> are considered true possibilities. The present experiment thus
created  a  context  in  which  people  will  consider  (though  not  necessarily  accept)
alternative  possibilities  to  the  presumed initial-model  representation.  Moreover,  this
contextual manipulation was embedded in a test-retest design, where during the retest of
the compatibility question, participants were explicitly informed what it means for two
utterances to be possibility-based compatible. 
17 Method. After having obtained informed consent, we asked 141 final year (17-19 year old)
Montreal high-school students to judge whether two contrary conditionals ("if the figure
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is a circle, then it is red" and "if the figure is a circle, then it is not red", translated from
French)  are  "compatible"  or  "incompatible".  We  subsequently  asked  them  to  judge
(counterbalanced in order) whether a "non circle that is not-red" (i.e. FF<not-A_not_C) is
"possible" or "impossible" when assuming <if A then C> is true, and whether a "non-circle
that is not-red" (i.e, FT<not-A_not-C>) is possible or impossible when assuming <if A then
not-C> is true. After having answered these two truth-table task questions, they were
again asked to evaluate whether the same two contrary conditionals  are compatible.
Moreover, and most importantly, in the re-test question participants were explicitly told
that "two assertions are compatible when they have at least one possible situation in
common. That is, they are compatible when there is at least one situation that is possible
according to the two assertions".  After  having answered the compatibility  questions,
subjects answered an induction-problem question (see, Results and Discussion). 
18 Results  and  Discussion.  The  truth-table  task  questions  produced  the  expected  high
"possible" judgments of FF<not-A_not-C> and FT<not-A_not-C>; respectively 86.5% and
76.6%. This is but a mere replication of a well established truth-table task phenomenon
(see,  Schroyens,  2007a, in press a,  for meta-analyses).  The potential priming effect of
these possibility judgments is obviously what interests us here. Given that about 80% of
subjects explicitly judged <not-A_not-C> to be possible when assuming <if A then C> and
<if A then not-C> to be true, and given that they were explicitly told what it means for two
utterances  to  be  compatible, one  would  expect  these  subjects  to  judge  the  two
conditionals to be compatible. It seems but a simple application of a given rule, i.e., the
definition of compatibility proffered by Handley et al. (2006). No such thing. There was no
'improvement'  whatsoever.  The conditionals  were judged compatible  by 21.98  % and
21.98% of participants answering respectively the first and second compatibility question.
We take the complete failure of any subject to successfully apply Handley et al.'s (2006)
definition as a suggestion that modal reasoners are not reasoning about the conditionals
on the basis of possibilities and that the possibility based compatibility is normatively
inappropriate. 
19 Of course, it has not been shown that suppositional-conditional theory cannot explain the
incompatibility judgment of contrary conditionals. First, what has been shown is that if
suppositional-conditional theory assumes a possibility-based judgment process  and one
thus makes a fair comparison by evenly assuming people make compatibility judgments
on  the  basis  of  an  overlap  of  the  possibilities  that  are  consistent  with  contrary
conditionals, then it fails to explain the data just as much as mental-models theory does.
Since suppositional-conditional theory is compatible with the notion of possibility-based
judgments  (cf.  supra),  one  cannot  engage  in  special  pleading  and  presume  without
further justification that possibility-based judgments do not apply in the context of the
novel compatibility-judgment task. 
20 Second,  the  results  provide  a  clear  indication  that  the  notion  of  possibility-based
compatibility judgments is best abandoned as a hypothesis about how people go about in
judging that propositions are compatible. Though it is not an a-priori theoretical reason,
the  explanatory  inadequacy  of  possibility-based  compatibility  judgments  (both  when
using  it  in  mental-models  theory  and  suppositional-conditional theory)  gives  an
empirical reason to abandon the idea that people spontaneously make possibility-based
judgments in reasoning about their beliefs in the conditionals to judge whether they are
compatible. It has been shown that they certainly have difficulty reasoning in line with
the notion of possibility-based compatibility judgments.  This concurs with Schroyens'
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(2009, in press a) recent evidence that people are susceptible to the induction-problem
and also have difficulty reasoning in line with possibility-based truth judgments. Indeed,
mental-models  theory  provides  an  a-priori  theoretical  reason  against  the  normative
adequacy of possibility-based judgments. People will not tend to endorse conclusions that
throw away semantic information, and this is exactly what one would do in endorse the
conclusion that "if p then q" or "if p then not-q" is true when "not-q and not-q" is true. 
21 To test people’s sensitivity to the induction problem, the 141 participants in the present
study also answered two induction-problem questions. (These problems were presented
after the compatibility questionnaire, which means that they could not have affected the
compatibility results that have been the focus of the present study and the preceding
discussion). We asked them to "imagine a collection of 100 colored geometrical figures.
You have identified the shape and color of 90 figures. Ten figures remain hidden and
unidentified”. An indeterminate problem-set described 65, 0, 20 and 5 TT, TF, FF and FT
cases and explicated 10 figures were unidentified. A determinate problem-set described
50/15/20/5 different TT/TF/FF/FT cases and is determinate because there are TF cases
falsifying  the  rule.  (The  presentation  order  of  the  determinate  and  indeterminate
problem  was  counterbalanced).  Participants  were  asked:  "Is  it  possible  to  evaluate
whether the rule is true or false, taking into consideration that there remain unidentified
figures?". They selected one of three response alternatives: "No, for the time being, one
cannot know whether the rule is irrefutably true or false", "Yes, the rule is irrefutably
true" and "Yes,  the rule is  manifestly false".  The determinate problem was correctly
solved by 63.5% of people judge that the conditional rule was false about the incomplete
set with 10 falsifying FT cases and the indeterminate problem was correctly solved by
79.7% of people judging that one cannot decide whether the rule is true, given a context
where unidentified cases might still  falsify the rule.  These additional  findings clearly
indicate that people are susceptible to the induction problem (i.e, the loss of semantic
information), and generally do not think a rule can be made true on the basis of cases that
are merely consistent with this rule. This concurs with Johnson-Laird and Byrne's (2002)
distinction between reasoning about possibilities on the basis of the presumed truth of
the  conditional  and  reasoning  about  truth  on  the  basis  of  possibilities  and  further
undermines  the  applicability  of  Handley  et  al.'s  (2006)  possibility-based  notion  of
compatibility. A single case is insufficient to establish the truth of a proposition; hence
this single case can a fortiori never be sufficient to establish that two propositions can be
true at the same time. 
 
Experiment 2 and 3: A Truth-based versus possibility-
based notion of compatibility. 
22 We have shown that when we use the possibility-based compatibility notion both mental-
models theory  and  suppositional-conditional  theory  must  predict  that  idealized
reasoners should consider contrary conditionals compatible. This stands in stark contrast
with the fact that modal reasoners do not consider them compatible.  We suggest the
theoretical gap between would (the descriptive) and should (the normative) is best filled
by reconsidering the notion of compatibility,  and this independent of whether one is
partisan to  one or  the other  theory.  That  is,  it  seems that  people  do not  engage in
reasoning  about  their  beliefs  to  establish  whether  they  are  compatible  but  have  a
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different  task  construal  and  engage  at  least  in  part  in  reasoning  from the  truth  of
conditionals when they are asked to judge the conditionals are compatible. 
23 We suggest that when people are considering the compatibility of their beliefs, modal
reasoners  are  at  least  in  part  reasoning  from their  beliefs  and  adopt  a  higher-level
interpretation of compatibility signifying two utterances can be true at the same time. It
is such a notion, based on the assumption that people reason from the conditionals to
judged their compatibility, that Handley et al. (2006) unevenly used to evaluate their own
theory. Let us denote this truth-based compatibility (vs. possibility-based compatibility,
defined by a shared true possibility). If <if A then C> is true, then TF<A_not-C> is false/
impossible: it is never possible. This is not an issue of discussion (see, Handley et al., 2006,
p. 563). However, if <if A then not-C> is true, then people think TT<A_not-C> must be
possible.  Since  <A_not-C>  cannot  be  possible  and  impossible  at  the  same  time,  the
conditionals cannot be true at the same time; hence they are truth-based incompatible.  
24 The expert reader will note that it is not necessary TT<A_not-C> cases exist when uttering
<if  A  then  not-C>.  The  existential  presuppositioniii  that  such  TT  cases  are  true
possibilities (a.k.a. 'existential import' in predicate calculus) is a direct consequence of
the  mental-model  theory's  initial model  principle,  which is  constrained by the  truth-
principle. Many critics have stated that according to the theory's truth-principle, people
would represent true possibilities. This is only correct when one does not misinterprets
"true possibilities" as if they are possibilities that make the conditional true. The theory's
truth-principle  states  that  "each  mental  model  of  a  set  of  assertions  represents  a
possibility given the truth of the assertions" (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p. 653, italics
added). That is, true possibilities are not a possibility that make the conditional true but
are by definition cases that are possible given the conditional is true (and one is thus
reasoning from the conditional). The initial-representation principle of the theory, which
is  based  on  the  idea  of  cognitive  economy,  furthermore  proffers  that  of  all  true
possibilities people at first consider only TT. That is, when first being confronted with a
conditional utterance like 'if A then C" people will pragmatically assume it istrue (see
Gilbert, 1991; Grice, 1975) and construct a representation of the "A and C" contingency.
That is, assuming the conditional is true, TT is a true possibility: This is nothing more or
less than the existential presupposition. 
25 To investigate the existential presupposition we asked a first group of participants to
construct a truth-table case distribution (Experiment 2).  They indicate the number of
cases of a particular type (TT, TF, …) that would need to be present in a set such that it
makes sense to assert a conditional rule about that set. If people make the existential
presupposition,  then  they  would  spontaneously  generate  frequency  distributions  in
which there are TT cases. Given the presumed meaning of a conditional, they would not
include TF cases especially when it is made clear that "if the figure is circle, then it is
colored red" does not say the same as "if the figure is a circle, then it is possible that the
figure is red" (see, Schroyens et al., 2008, also see Bennett's, 2003, "semantic occamism").
A second group of participants (Experiment 3) was given a description of the distribution
of the different truth-table cases in a set and asked to evaluate whether it is possible/
impossible to utter the conditional about the given set. If people make the existential
presupposition, then they would tend to state <if A then C> is impossible when there are
no  TT<A_C>  cases.  When  there  are  TF<A_C>  cases,  the  rule  would  also  be  judged
impossible. We therefore also gave participants the description of a set in which there
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were  neither  <A_C>  nor  <A_not-C>  cases.  Hence,  <if  A  then C>  would  not  be  judged
impossible simply because there are falsying TF<A_not-C> cases. 
26 Method.  A  total  of  188  11th  and  12th  grade  students  at  a  Flemish  high-school
participated.  Ninety-five  students  completed  the  production  task  (Experiment  2),
whereas 93 students completed the evaluation task (Experiment 3)  .  Figure 1 gives a
reproduction of truth-table construction task about <if A then not-C> (translated from
Dutch). The same content and format was used for <if A then C>, presented either first or
second. After having completed the construction tasks, participants were asked to judge
whether "if the figure is a circle, then it is colored red" and "if it is a circle then it is not
colored  red"  are  compatible  or  incompatible.  Figure  2  gives  a  reproduction  of  the
sentence-evaluation task. Evaluation-task participants (Experiment 3) were not given the
compatibility question. 
 
Figure 1. Reproduction of the truth-table construction task used in Experiment 2. 
 
Figure 2. Reproduction of the sentence-evaluation task used in Experiment 3. 
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27 Results and discussion. Some of the truth-table construction participants (N=30/95) had
provided a likelihood or percentage instead of  a  frequency with the four truth-table
cases. That is, the sum of cases they used did not match the total number of 100 figures in
the set. We therefore dichotomized all scores. When either the frequency or likelihood
was 0,  it  remained 0;  otherwise participants had indicated that there had to be such
truth-table cases (independent of  however frequent or likely they thought this  was).
Table 2 presents the results. 
28 First, for both rules, the vast majority of people (86.3% and 88.4%) used TT cases. These
are TT<A_C> cases for <if A then C> and TT<A_not-C> cases for <if A then not-C>. That is,
reasoners clearly tend to assume that there have to be "red circles" before one can make
the claim that "if the figure is a circle, then it is red". This implies that when people use a
truth-based notion of compatibility, two contrary utterances are incompatible. Second,
Table 2 shows that the majority of people use false antecedent cases for both rules. That is,
some 'non-circular and non-red' figures are used and accepted in a set for which it both
holds that "if the figure is a circle, then it is red" and "if it is a circle then it is not red".
This implies that, if people were to use a possibility-based notion of compatibility, they
would judge the two conditionals compatible. They clearly do not. There were 18 out of 95
participants (i.e., 18.9%) who judged the contrary conditionals compatible. This is a long
way from the about 70% of participants who indicated that the two contrary conditionals
share a common possibility. That is, as indicated by Experiment 1, participants do not
seem to adopt a possibility-based notion of compatibility. 
 
Table 2. Proportion of participants (N=95) who used the different truth-table cases to construct a
set about which one can assert the conditional rule (Experiment 2). 
Rule TT TF FT FF 
If A then C 86.3 18.9 60.0 76.8
If A then not-C 88.4 14.7 70.5 77.9
29 In Experiment 3, the "evaluation-task" group evaluated both the <if A then C> and <if A
then not-C> conditional about a set in which there were neither <A_C> nor <A_not-C>
cases (but some <not-A_C> and <not-A_not-C> cases.  The if  A then C rule was judged
impossible by 86.1%. (The <if A then not-C> rule was judged impossible in 54.8% of cases,
which is in line with the difficulty of processing negations: see,  e.g.,  Schroyens et al,
2001).  They  could  not  have  come  to  this  conclusion  because  there  were  falsifying
TF<A_not-C> cases in the set.  The high 'impossible'  rates therefore corroborates that
people make the pragmatic implicature, i.e., existential presupposition that the TT<A_C>
cases  most  be  real  possibilities  before  it  makes  sense  to  make  a  claim  about  the
hypothetical relation between <A> and <C>. 
 
General Discussion 
30 Experiment 1, as well as Experiments 2 and 3, suggest that people are not reasoning about
conditionals to decide whether they are compatible and, thus, do not use a possibility-
based  notion  of  compatibility.  I  suggested  that  instead  they  are  reasoning  from
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conditionals  and  use  a  truth-based  notion  in  which  two  assertions  are  judged  as
compatible when they can be true at the same time. In mental-models theory <A and C> is
a possible case (and initially the only possible case considered) when reasoning from the
assumption that <if A then C> is true. At the same time, this same case is impossible when
reasoning from the assumption that <if A then not-C> is true. It follows that the two
contrary conditionals are truth-based incompatible.  They cannot be true at the same
time.  Experiment  2  confirmed  the  tendency  for  people  to  make  the  existential
presupposition that there are (physically real or fictional) TT cases when the conditional
is  assumed true  and these  cases  establish  the  falsity  of  the  contrary  conditional.  In
summary,  first,  mental-models  and  suppositional-conditional  theory  do  not  make
opposing predictions and,  second, the evidence suggests that people reason from the
assumption of truth and adopt a truth-based notion of compatibility.  
 
Reasoning about the truth versus reasoning from the presumed
truth of propositions 
31 How do the lower-level and higher-level definitions of compatibility relate? The former is
defined as a function of possibilities, whereas the latter is defined as a function of truth.
When  we  consider  mental-models  theory,  these  concepts  are  not  psychologically
equivalent: 
32 “Discourse  about  the  truth  or  falsity  of  propositions  is  at  a  higher  level  than mere
descriptions of possibilities”. (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p. 653) Mental-models theory
implies that when the conditional is assumed true (and people are thus reasoning from
the conditionals), the false-antecedent cases are possible. It does not work the other way
round: Truth goes down, but does not go up. The truth of a conditional implies that the
false antecedent cases are true possibilities, but the truth of a false-antecedent case does
not  imply  that  the  conditional  is  true.  This  is  a  straightforward  application  of  the
semantic-information  principle  of  mental-models  theory.  The  semantic-information
principle  states  that  people  will  tend  not  to  endorse  conclusions  whose  semantic
information is higher than the premise(s) it is based on (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p.
652; also see Johnson-laird & Byrne, 1991, 1993). Semantic informativeness refers to the
number of possibilities rule out by a proposition (but see, Dekeyser, Schroyens, Schaeken,
Spitaels,  &  d'Ydewalle,  2000).  The  assertion  "not-A  and  not-C"  rules  out  3  out  of  4
possibilities; only the "not-A and not-C" combination is a true possibility. In contrast, the
conditional rules out only 1 out of 4 possibilities. "All theories of the conditional agree
that the only state of affairs that contradicts [if the cat is happy then she purs] 1 is a
happy cat not purring (TF), and so all other cases are possible" (Evans, 2007, p. 54). That
is, going from the truth of one truth-table case to the truth of the conditional proposition
involves a loss of semantic information (3/4 vs. 1/4). It follows within mental-models
theory that people will not tend to think that the conditional is true when a particular
possibility is true. If follows, a fortiori, that people will not believe that not just one both
two  conditionals  are  true  at  the  same  time  when  they  happen  to  share  a  common
possibility. 
33 Of course, the fact that the semantic-information principle is part of the mental-models
theory (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) implies that Handley et al. (2006) is mistaken in
its  undefended  special  pleading  and  selective  attribution  of  possibility-based
compatibility to mental-models theory. It is true that until recently (Schroyens, 2009, in
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press a; also see Barrouillet et al., 2008) many theorists never gave much attention to the
semantic-information  principle  and  the  distinction  between  reasoning  from  versus
reasoning about propositions. However, that is quite irrelevant. One should not critique a
theory on the basis of the fact that proponents of that theory did not flesh out particular
implications of the theory. When 'opponents' have not derived particular predictions,
theoretical rigor and neutrality requires one still makes the best possible case to derive
predictions from the 'opposing' theory (see the so-called principle of charity in Damer,
2003; also see Schroyens, 2007). Science advances more when one is able to form a valid
critique of the stronger theory, as compared to an easy and superficial criticism against a
weak straw-man version of a theory. 
34 The distinction between reasoning from and reasoning about conditionals is also relevant
to understand how suppositional-conditional theorists can claim that the subjective belief
in "if p then q" is measured as the conditional probability of ‘q, given p’ while the theory
at the same time can claim that TF<p.not-q> cases are impossible and show a conditional
is false. If the TF<p.not-q> cases are truly impossible then their probability is zero. That is,
P(p.not-q) = 0. It follows --given P(q|p)= 1 – P(not-q|p) -- that P(q|p) = 1. That is, how can
suppositional-conditional theory explain that the subjective belief in the conditional is
truly  probabilistic  and  less  then  certain,  when  the  theory  also  states  that  the
interpretation of "if" can be non-probabilistic and people are categorically about TF being
impossible? The solution to this conundrum is found in the distinction between reasoning
from the assumption that the conditional is true versus reasoning about the truth of the
conditional. When reasoning from the assumption that the conditional is true, they are
invited to set their subjective belief in q, given p to unity: P(q|p) = 1. When people are
reasoning about the conditional, it is actually this subjective belief in the conditional that
needs to be determined. In this case people need to use their representation of what is
possible and impossible to estimate it. As Ohm and Thompson (2008, p. 273) noted about
conditional probabilities: "these probabilities, however, are not explanatory constructs.
Rather they are mathematical summaries that represent the culmination of one or more
underlying  representational  processes."  In  some  way  the  suppositional-conditional
theory needs to consider how people go about in reasoning on the basis of possibilities in
order to establish their belief in the conditional. How exactly subjective probabilities are
established, need not concern us here. The crux of the matter is that in doing so people
are making possibility-based judgments in reasoning about the conditional on the basis of
possibilities. It is quite something else when people are reasoning from their belief in the
truth (or if not truth, then truthfulness) of conditionals. In this case, the conditional-
probability theory makes the straightforward predictions that their belief in two contrary
conditionals should be complementary. Indeed, P(q|p) = 1 - P(¬q|p). 
 
General conclusion 
35 As  regards  the  compatibility  of  contrary  conditionals,  mental-models  theory  and
suppositional theory are compatible – pun intended. When one makes a fair comparison,
both  mental-models  theory  and  suppositional-conditional  theory  yield  the  same
predictions  from  the  same  hypothesis  about  what  'compatible'  means  for  modal
reasoners.  Though  the  negation  of  conditionals  might  still  be  a  litmus  test  of
suppositional  conditional  theory,  the  compatibility  of  contrary  conditionals  and  the
contrary beliefs expressed by these conditional is not. Handley et al.’s (2006) and our own
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findings suggest people are in part reasoning from their beliefs and are not reasoning
about their beliefs to evaluate whether they are compatible. 
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NOTES
1.  An anonymous reviewer has claimed that page 560 of Handley et al. (2006), from which I cite
the possibility-based definition, does provide reasons for (in my view one-sidedly) considering
possibility based  judgments  within  mental-models  theory  (but  not  suppositional-conditional
theory).  On  page  560  one  effectively  finds  an  explication  of  how  contrary  conditional  are
compatible in mental-models theory, given one assumes possibility-based judgments. Assuming it
is  indeed  the  case  that  contrary  conditional  are  incompatible  according  the  suppositional-
conditional  theory  (which  I  argue  is  not  the  case  when evenly  considering  possibility-based
judgments  in  this  theory  and  is  only  the  case  when  unevenly  presuming  a  truth-based
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compatibility judgment), this would indeed imply the theories do not agree (which is a stretch
away  from  the  claim  that  they  “cannot  agree”  about  the  singular  issue  of  compatibility
judgments).  But  the  trivial  illustration/explication  of  possibility-based  judgments  in  mental-
models  theory,  is  of  course  begging  the  question.  Since  when  is  an  illustration  of  the
consequences of a principle, that is, the application of a principle, a justification of applying this
principle in the first place? Let me extrapolate. In the second world war millions of Jews (and
other “deviants” such as homosexuals, political opponents, …) were sent to the gas chambers and
up until the sixties it happened in the US that black Americans were lynched because they were
'inferior': a rather simple application of the principle that they were considered inferior and not
on equal footing such that their individual sovereignty was not to be respected. I fail to see that
this implementation of an idea, justifies the principle. 
There is a strong cross-theoretical consensus about the idea that many people often do not come
to a conditional interpretation, but reason towards the so-called bi-conditional interpretation in
which FT<not-A_C> is considered impossible (see Schroyens, 2007a, in press, for meta-analyses).
When people have a bi-conditional interpretation of the contrary conditionals or even of just one
of  the  two  conditionals,  they  do  not  share  a  true  possibility,  and  are thus  not  compatible.
Handley et al. did not take this well-accepted fact into account in their argumentation, which is
therefore weakened considerable already. 
Mental-models theory claims that the antecedent of a conditional creates a context, and that the
consequent is interpreted within that context. This context does not need to be real and does not
need to correspond to a factual state of affairs. That is, the existential presupposition does not
mean that TT cases are supposed to be real, factual states of affairs. One of the human marvels is
indeed their imagination and ability to think hypothetically about other possible worlds. 
ABSTRACTS
How do people go about in evaluating the consistency of their beliefs? Do people reason from or
do they reason about their beliefs in judging whether they are compatible, or both? The paper
investigates how people evaluate belief in contrary conditionals <if A then C> and <if A then not-C>.
 Experiment 1 (N=141) indicates people do not use a notion of possibility-based compatibility
according to which claims are compatible when they share a common possibility: After being
given this definition, there was no improvement of compatibility judgments even though more
than 60% confirmed a shared possibility. Experiment 2 (N = 95) and Experiment 3 (N=93) test the
alternative truth-based notion of compatibility,  according to which contrary conditionals are
incompatible because they cannot be true at the same time. The sets people construct for a true
conditional invariably include “A and C” cases (Experiment 2) and “if A then C” is judged “un-
assertable” about sets that do no include such cases (Experiment 3). Such “A and C” cases are at
the  same  time  impossible  when   "if  A  then  not-C"  is  true.  Findings  thus  suggest  contrary
conditionals are judged incompatible because they cannot be true at the same time. 
Comment  évalue-t-on  la  cohérence  de  nos  croyances?  Est-ce  qu'on raisonne  en  prenant  nos
croyances  pour  vraies  ou  les  remet-on  en  question  afin  de  juger  si  elles sont  compatibles?
L'article  présente  une  recherche  sur  l'évaluation  des  croyances  en  deux  conditionnelles
contraires:  "si  A alors  C" et  "si  A alors  non C".  Expérience 1 (N =  141)  montre que les  gens
n'utilisent pas une notion de compatibilité-des-possibilités, selon laquelle deux assertions sont
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compatibles quand elles ont une possibilité partagée: Après avoir accepté cette définition, il n'y
pas d’augmentation de jugements de compatibilité même si plus de 60% affirment une possibilité
partagée. Les Expérience 2 (N = 95) et 3 (N = 93) testent la notion de compatibilité-de-vérité, selon
laquelle  des  expressions  sont  incompatibles  quand  elles  ne  peuvent  être  vraies  en  même
moment.  Les ensembles de cas qu’elles composent pour un conditionnel vrai incluent les cas <A
et C> (Expérience 2) et <si A alors C> est jugé "non-assertif" pour des ensembles qui n’incluent pas
ce genre de cas. Les cases <A et C> sont en même temps impossible quand <si A alors ne pas C > est
vrai.  Les résultats  confirment ainsi  que les  conditionnels  contraires sont jugés incompatibles
parce qu’ils ne peuvent pas être vrais en même temps. 
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